Skip to content
Snippets Groups Projects
  1. Oct 23, 2012
    • Eric Dumazet's avatar
      tcp: RFC 5961 5.2 Blind Data Injection Attack Mitigation · 354e4aa3
      Eric Dumazet authored
      
      RFC 5961 5.2 [Blind Data Injection Attack].[Mitigation]
      
        All TCP stacks MAY implement the following mitigation.  TCP stacks
        that implement this mitigation MUST add an additional input check to
        any incoming segment.  The ACK value is considered acceptable only if
        it is in the range of ((SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND) <= SEG.ACK <=
        SND.NXT).  All incoming segments whose ACK value doesn't satisfy the
        above condition MUST be discarded and an ACK sent back.
      
      Move tcp_send_challenge_ack() before tcp_ack() to avoid a forward
      declaration.
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
      Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
      Cc: Jerry Chu <hkchu@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      354e4aa3
  2. Oct 22, 2012
  3. Oct 20, 2012
  4. Oct 19, 2012