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Commit 8fbdf654 authored by Josh Poimboeuf's avatar Josh Poimboeuf Committed by Yongqiang Liu
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x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting

stable inclusion
from stable-v4.19.234
commit 995629e1d8e6751936c6e2b738f70b392b0461de
category: bugfix
bugzilla: 186453, https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I50WBM


CVE: CVE-2022-0001

--------------------------------

commit 44a3918c8245ab10c6c9719dd12e7a8d291980d8 upstream.

With unprivileged eBPF enabled, eIBRS (without retpoline) is vulnerable
to Spectre v2 BHB-based attacks.

When both are enabled, print a warning message and report it in the
'spectre_v2' sysfs vulnerabilities file.

Signed-off-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 4.19]
Signed-off-by: default avatarFrank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Conflicts:
    kernel/sysctl.c

Signed-off-by: default avatarChen Jiahao <chenjiahao16@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarHanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarLiao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarYongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13@huawei.com>
parent f72da20e
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......@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
#include <asm/e820/api.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include "cpu.h"
......@@ -607,6 +608,16 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void)
static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
#endif
#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS on, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state)
{
if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && !new_state)
pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
}
#endif
static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
{
int len = strlen(opt);
......@@ -950,6 +961,9 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
break;
}
if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
/* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
......@@ -1672,6 +1686,20 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void)
return "";
}
static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf)
{
if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: Unprivileged eBPF enabled\n");
return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
ibpb_state(),
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
stibp_state(),
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
spectre_v2_module_string());
}
static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
......@@ -1697,12 +1725,7 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
ibpb_state(),
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
stibp_state(),
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
spectre_v2_module_string());
return spectre_v2_show_state(buf);
case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
......
......@@ -546,6 +546,11 @@ static inline int bpf_map_attr_numa_node(const union bpf_attr *attr)
struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get_type_path(const char *name, enum bpf_prog_type type);
int array_map_alloc_check(union bpf_attr *attr);
static inline bool unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void)
{
return !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled;
}
#else /* !CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
static inline struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd)
{
......@@ -657,6 +662,12 @@ static inline struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get_type_path(const char *name,
{
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
}
static inline bool unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void)
{
return false;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
static inline struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get_type(u32 ufd,
......
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